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NOTE
Pennsylvania v. Conroy: Expanded
Administrative Expense Priority for
State-Funded CERCLA Cleanups
BY SETH M. MANDELBAUM*
I. Introduction
In Pennsylvania v. Conroy,' the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the decision of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Penn-
sylvania.2 The court held that cleanup expenses incurred by a
state environmental agency to remove the threat posed by
hazardous wastes should be treated as administrative ex-
penses under the Bankruptcy Code. 3 Thus, the Third Circuit
afforded state response costs high priority when the assets of
the bankruptcy estate were distributed. In addition, this case
expanded prior decisions by holding that administrative and
* The author would like to thank his family for their patience and sup-
port, and Susan for putting up with me. Also thanks to Arlene Diamond and
her group for a great editing job.
1. Pennsylvania v. Conroy, 24 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1994).
2. In re Conroy, 153 B.R. 686 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
3. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)) [hereinafter Bank-
ruptcy Code].
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legal costs incurred by a state agency, usually around 10% of
the total costs, should also be awarded to the agency.4 This
expansion is the most important contribution of Conroy.
Unfortunately, the Third Circuit, like other circuit courts
before it, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court, failed to resolve
two extreme views on the conflict between the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA)P and the Bankruptcy Code. The con-
flict is whether the state agency should be denied administra-
tive expense priority (making site cleanup nearly impossible),
or whether it should receive such priority (and sometimes the
entire proceeds of the bankruptcy estate), possibly leaving
the estate with no assets to satisfy the debtors' obligations to
other creditors.
This paper will suggest amending the Bankruptcy Code
to include an express administrative expense priority for haz-
ardous waste remediation. Such an amendment is necessary,
since neither the courts nor Congress has resolved the issue.
Since 1986, however, the trend in the federal circuit courts
has been toward affording state cleanup costs a high
priority.6
II. Background
A. CERCLA
1. Purpose of CERCLA
In the late 1970s, Congress determined that its existing
programs for dealing with hazardous waste were inade-
quate.7 CERCLA was designed to eliminate the problems
4. Conroy, 24 F.3d 568, 570-71.
5. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA) §§ 101-405, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) [hereinafter CERCLA].
6. See infra part II.D.
7. See U.S. v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111-12 (D.
Minn. 1982) (denying Reilly Tar's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for a CERCLA claim
brought by the United States and the State of Minnesota for contamination of
the ground and groundwater in and around the city of St. Louis Park,
Minnesota).
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presented by hazardous waste sites that were not sufficiently
addressed by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA).8 The routine practice of burying highly toxic chemi-
cal wastes had resulted in serious threats to the environment
and to public health, especially to the underground aquifers
upon which half the nation relies for its drinking water.9
The main policy objectives of CERCLA are twofold.
First, Congress intended to give the federal government the
tools required for an immediate and effective response to the
aforementioned problems resulting from hazardous waste
disposal.10 Second, Congress intended that responsible par-
ties bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harm-
ful conditions they created.11 To help accomplish this goal,
where the environmental harm is indivisible, Congress pro-
vided that liability would be made joint and several. 12
The jurisdictional grant of CERCLA provides that:
[W]hen the President determines that there may be an im-
minent and substantial endangerment to the public health
8. Id. at 1111. The national policy of RCRA is "that, wherever feasible, the
generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously
as possible. Waste that is nevertheless generated should be treated, stored, or
disposed of so as to minimize the present and future threat to human health
and the environment." Solid Waste Disposal Act § 1003(b), 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b)
(1988). CERCLA, however, deals with hazardous waste that was not treated,
stored, or disposed of properly, leaving sites which present an imminent and
significant threat to public health or the environment. See CERCLA § 106(a),
42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1980).
9. See U.S. v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1057 (D.N.J. 1981). In Price, the
United States brought an action for injunctive relief to remedy the hazards
posed by chemical dumping that occurred at Price's landfill during 1971 and
1972. The court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, but also
denied defendants' motions for summary judgment, except with respect to
plaintiffs' cause of action based on the federal common law of nuisance, which
was dismissed with prejudice. Id.
10. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992) (hold-
ing that municipal defendants are responsible parties under CERCLA if their
solid waste contains a hazardous substance listed in CERCLA § 101(14), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(14) in any amount).
11. Id. at 1198.
12. Id. This means that each defendant may be held responsible for the
entire damage caused. In addition, a verdict in favor of one defendant will not
discharge the others from liability. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 47, at 327-28 (5th ed. 1984).
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or welfare or the environment because of an actual or
threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facil-
ity, he may require the Attorney General of the United
States to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate
such danger or threat .... 13
The statute originally established a $1.6 billion Hazardous
Substance Response Trust Fund, commonly referred to as the
"Superfund."14  In addition to the Superfund-financed
cleanup structure, CERCLA provided that the federal govern-
ment, state governments, and private parties who have per-
formed remedial work can sue potentially responsible parties
(PRPs)15 in order to recover their costs. In United States v.
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 16 the court stated:
In bringing an action under this Act, the government must
establish that: (1) defendant is one of the four categories of
covered persons listed under § 9607(a) as liable for the
costs of remedial action,17 (2) the site of the cleanup is a
13. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).
14. CERCLA § 111(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1980), amended by The
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613, 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1986). The money for the Superfund was to
be generated by an excise tax on petroleum products and chemical feedstocks,
based on a theory of unjust enrichment. Since chemical and oil companies had
profited from degrading the environment, Congress reasoned they should pay
for remediation. The Superfund was to be used to finance governmental re-
sponse activities, to pay some claims arising from private response activities,
and to compensate federal or state governmental entities for damage caused to
natural resources. National Governors'Association Position on Superfund, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. E1022 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1986) (statement of
Rep. Florio).
15. PRP is a legal term of art used by Superfund attorneys to refer to cov-
ered persons under CERCLA. See infra note 17.
16. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993)
(upheld summary judgment against Alcan for its contribution to a waste dispo-
sal and treatment center in Oswego, New York, which had become contami-
nated with hazardous substances, rejecting Alcan's arguments concerning
minimum concentration requirements and causation).
17. The four classes of responsible persons are:
a. The owner and operator of a vessel or a facility;
b. Any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of;
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/11
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facility under § 9601(9),18 (3) there is a release or
threatened release of hazardous substances 19 at the facil-
ity, (4) as a result of which plaintiff has incurred response
costs, and (5) the costs incurred2 ° conform to the national
contingency plan 21 under § 9607(a)(4)(A) as administered
c. Any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged
for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for trans-
port for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or
possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facil-
ity or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances; and
d. Any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels
or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of
a hazardous substance....
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
18. The term 'facility' means (A) any building, structure, installation,
equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or pub-
licly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impound-
ment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock,
or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has
been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to
be located; but does not include any consumer product in consumer
use or any vessel.
CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9).
19. The term "hazardous substance' is defined broadly by CERCLA
§ 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). The definition includes substances designated
as hazardous or toxic under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act [hereinaf-
ter Clean Water Act] §§ 101-120, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1986), hazardous air
pollutants as listed in the Clean Air Act § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1984), and
hazardous wastes listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal
Act, which includes RCRA (42 U.S.C. § 6921), as well as any element, com-
pound, mixture, solution or substance designated pursuant to § 102 of CER-
CLA. Petroleum and natural gas products are excluded from the definition.
CERCLA § 101(14)(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(f).
20. CERCLA holds responsible parties liable for "all costs of removal or re-
medial action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an In-
dian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan." CERCLA
§ 107(a)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A).
21. The National Contingency Plan (NCP) "shall include a section of the
plan to be known as the national hazardous substance response plan which
shall establish procedures and standards for responding to releases of hazard-
ous substances, pollutants, and contaminants...." CERCLA § 105, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605. See also 40 C.F.R. § 300 (1994). Part 300.105 provides that federal
agencies should plan for emergencies, such as oil spills, and coordinate this
planning with affected states, local governments and private entities. Response
5
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by the [United States Environmental Protection Agency]
EPA.22
Thus, the statute imposes strict liability upon PRPs.
23
2. Reauthorization of CERCLA-The Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA), The 1990 Reauthorization and S. 1834
(Superfund Reform Act of 1994)
The taxation and funding authority of CERCLA expired
on September 30, 1985,24 forcing Congress to reexamine the
cleanup program. Among the major changes implemented by
SARA were a much larger fund of $8.5 billion, very ambitious
enforcement timetables for EPA, restriction of EPA discretion
in settlement and remedial approaches, a public notice and
comment requirement on remedial plans, and the deprivation
of judicial jurisdiction to review EPA remedial decisions prior
to the initiation of enforcement actions.
25
While CERCLA was once again reauthorized in 1990, no
major modifications other than funding renewal were made
at that time. 26 However, through the Superfund Reform Act
of 1994, the Clinton Administration sought several new
changes to CERCLA. 27 The main proposals sought by the Ad-
operations are to be performed by the National and Regional Response Teams
and directed by the on-scene coordinator.
22. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 719-20 (2d Cir.
1993).
23. Murtha, 958 F.2d at 1198. Strict liability, or liability without fault, is
imposed where the defendant's activity is unusual and abnormal in the commu-
nity, and the danger which it threatens to others is unduly great. In addition,
the defendant is acting for his own purposes, is seeking a profit from such activ-
ities, and is in a better position to administer the unusual risk by passing it on
to the public than is the innocent victim. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 534-38 (5th ed. 1984). Under this
theory, as long as the release occurred at a PRP's facility, the PRP is liable.
24. See CERCLA §§ 131-33, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9631-9633.
25. See Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
26. See Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-319 (1990). Passed as a trailer
to the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, the reauthorization simply
extended the Superfund tax on oil and chemical companies to provide for in-
terim funding. Id.
27. John H. Cushman, Jr., Congress Forgoes Its Bid to Hasten Cleanup of
Dumps, N.Y. TimES, Oct. 6, 1994, at Al, A22.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/11
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ministration included increased community involvement in
determining how to treat a waste site; an Environmental Res-
olution Insurance Fund, financed by insurers, to help reim-
burse polluters for cleanup costs; and the substitution of
mediation for litigation whenever possible.28 In addition, a
flexible system was proposed whereby the level of cleanup re-
quired would depend on ultimate use of the property.29
No revision to CERCLA was enacted in 1994. Congress
failed to pass the bill, "citing inability to come to agreement
over a number of controversial amendments in the brief time
left in the current congressional session."30 However, the ex-
piring tax authority that funds the cleanups and popular sup-
port for reform are reasons for optimism that there will be
Superfund reform legislation in 1995. H.R. 228, the
Superfund Reform Act of 1995, was introduced on January 4,
1995.31 In addition, twelve initiatives covering enforcement,
economic redevelopment, community involvement in
Superfund decision-making, environmental justice, consis-
tent program implementation, and state and tribal empower-
ment were announced by EPA at a February 17, 1995 press
conference.3 2
B. The Bankruptcy Code
1. Purpose of Bankruptcy
The goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide for the "eq-
uitable distribution of the debtor's assets amongst his credi-
tors"3 3 and also allow the honest debtor a chance for a fresh
28. Id.
29. Id. For example, land to be used for a factory would not have to be as
clean as land proposed for use as a playground.
30. Congress Abandons Superfund Effort, Citing Number of Amendments,
Lack of Time, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. 72, at G-192 (Oct. 6, 1994).
31. H.R. 228, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
32. Additional Administrative Reforms for Superfund Program to be Un-
veiled, Daily Rep. for Exec. (BNA) No. 45, at A-33 (Feb. 17, 1995).
33. See, e.g., Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445, 451 (1937) (constru-
ing a section of the Bankruptcy Act dealing with claims by landlords for indem-
nity under a covenant contained in a lease which has been rejected by the
trustee in bankruptcy).
1995] 325
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start.34 The primary function of the bankruptcy system is to
continue the law-based orderliness of the open credit econ-
omy when a debtor cannot or will not pay his or her debts.
3 5
By promoting equality of distribution among creditors, the
bankruptcy process affects values on which the open credit
economy depends in order to function. 36 Through a bank-
ruptcy system, persons or businesses who suffer economic
hardship through no wrongdoing are protected from their
creditors. Without such protections, the economy would be
deprived of the entrepreneurial spirit upon which the Ameri-
can economy depends for its growth and prosperity.
2. The Structure of the Bankruptcy Code
The congressional power to enact bankruptcy legislation
comes from the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution, which
provides that Congress shall have the power to establish
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States."37 Congress exercised this express grant of
power by enacting bankruptcy laws in 1803, 1841, 1874 and
1898.38 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 39 codified in Ti-
tle 11 of the United States Code, repealed all laws in force at
the time of its enactment relating to bankruptcy.
40
Remedies under the Bankruptcy Code are designed in
the alternative. Corporate debtors are given the choice of
either a rehabilitative process under Chapter 11 or liquida-
tion under Chapter 7.4 1 Bankruptcy Code Chapter 11 is enti-
34. Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554
(1915) (holding that a discharge in bankruptcy acquits the express obligation of
the principal to indemnify his surety against loss).
35. Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States,
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 70, 71 (1973).
36. Id.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
38. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, 2 Stat. 19 (1800), repealed by 2 Stat. 248
(1803); 5 Stat. 440 (1841); 18 Stat. 178 (1874); 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
39. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2682 (1978).
40. See id., Title PV, § 401.
41. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-946; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1330. Liquidation under
Chapter 7 of the Code is available for debtors who are unable or unwilling to
repay their obligations and involves surrender of all assets (with some exemp-
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/11
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tled "Reorganization."42  "The primary purpose of the
reorganization chapters ... [is] to promote the restructuring
of debt and the preservation of economic units."43 Thus,
Chapter 11 debtors are permitted to retain assets, to restruc-
ture most debts, and to repay obligations over an extended
period of time.44 In return, the debtor's reorganization plan
is expected to preserve interests and to offer at least partial
repayment of all obligations, including unsecured debts.45
3. Sections of the Bankruptcy Code Pertinent to
Pennsylvania v. Conroy
Under section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code, "an entity
may timely file a request for payment of an administrative
expense."46 These administrative expenses, which are al-
lowed after notice and a hearing, include "the actual, neces-
sary costs and expenses of preserving the estate."47 In
addition, the priority scheme of section 507 of the Code gives
first distributive priority to "administrative expenses allowed
under section 503(b) of this title."48 The policy behind the al-
lowance of administrative expenses is that "the estate as a
whole is benefitted if general creditors subordinate their pre-
bankruptcy claims in order to secure goods and services nec-
essary to an orderly and economical administration of the es-
tate."49  Congress, in 1978, "granted priority to
tions) to a trustee. A "person" may be a debtor under Chapter 7 as long as such
person is not a railroad or a domestic or foreign bank or insurance company. Id.
42. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1330. Any person who may proceed under Chap-
ter 7 is eligible to be a debtor under Chapter 11, except that railroads may also
proceed under Chapter 11, and stockbrokers and commodity brokers, which are
allowed to be debtors under Chapter 7, are excluded from Chapter 11. Id. See
also 11 U.S.C. § 109.
43. See In re Nite Lite Inns, 17 B.R. 367, 370 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982) (con-
firming debtors' redistribution plan despite the objection of one of the creditors).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 503(a).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A). Some typical administrative expenses include
wages, salaries, or commissions for services rendered after the commencement
of the case. Id.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1).
49. In re Christian Life Ctr., 821 F.2d 1370, 1373 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting In
re Yermakov, 718 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983), affirming the district court's
1995] 327
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administrative expenses... to facilitate the efforts ... of the
debtor in possession to rehabilitate the business for the bene-
fit of all the estate's creditors."50 For a reorganization to suc-
ceed, priority must be given to creditors who are willing to
extend credit after a petition in bankruptcy is filed.5 1
Thereby, they will feel secure in providing the credit neces-
sary for the debtor to function. 52
Section 554 provides that "after notice and a hearing, the
trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is bur-
densome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and
benefit to the estate."5 3 In addition, "on request of a party in
interest and after notice and a hearing, the court may order
the trustee to abandon any property of the estate."5 4 Prop-
erty abandoned pursuant to section 554(a) ceases to be part of
the bankruptcy estate and reverts back to whoever had pos-
sessory right to the property at the time of the filing for
bankruptcy.55
While section 554 refers only to abandonment by a
trustee, the section applies to a debtor in possession as well.
56
Bankruptcy Rule 6007(a) states that "the trustee or debtor in
possession shall give notice of a proposed abandonment."
57
Similarly, Title 28 of the United States Code, on Judiciary
and Judicial Procedure, which contains a number of provi-
order disallowing the Christian Life Center Litigation Defense Committee's ad-
ministrative expense claim and vacating as premature its order subordinating
all indemnity claims).
50. Trustees of Amalgamated Ins. Fund v. McFarlin's, Inc., 789 F.2d 98,
101 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that "withdrawal liability" incurred by McFarlin's
under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381-
1461, is not entitled to administrative expense priority, and thus must be as-
serted by the Trustees of the Amalgamated Ins. Fund as a general unsecured
claim).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 554(b).
55. In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588, 590 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Utah's denial of the use by a Chapter 7 debtor of
11 U.S.C. § 506(d) to void the undersecured portion of a lien on real property
which has been abandoned by the bankruptcy estate).
56. See supra note 53.
57. 11 U.S.C. app. § 6007(a) (emphasis added).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/11
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sions relating to bankruptcy judges, trustees and jurisdiction,
implies abandonment is available to debtors in possession. 58
Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 959 provides that:
... a trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any cause
pending in any court of the United States, including a
debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the prop-
erty in his possession as such trustee, receiver or manager
according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State
in which such property is situated, in the same manner
that the owner or possessor thereof would be bound to do if
in possession thereof.59
Thus, section 959 places a limit on the abandonment
power of section 554: whoever is managing the property
must do so in accordance with all laws that the owner of the
property would be bound to follow. This limit has led to the
line of case law, followed by this case, which prevents a
trustee or debtor in possession from abandoning property in
contravention of environmental laws.60
4. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994
On October 22, 1994, President Clinton signed the Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1994 (H.R. 5116), saying it "stands out
as a significant achievement of the 103d Congress."6 1 Among
many other provisions, the bill sets up a fast track bank-
ruptcy for the small business debtor whose liabilities do not
exceed $2 million, ensures that a debtor may not use bank-
ruptcy to avoid paying legitimate marital and child support
obligations, and creates a bankruptcy review commission to
study and recommend future changes to the bankruptcy
laws.62
58. See Judiciary and Judicial Procedures, 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-158; 581-
589(a); 1334(a), (b), (d) (1994).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (emphasis added).
60. See infra part II.D.
61. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 Signed by President Clinton, Bankr.
Law Daily (BNA) (Oct. 26, 1994).
62. Congress Finally Passes Bankruptcy Reform Legislation, Bankr. Law
Daily (BNA) (Oct. 11, 1994). According to Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa),
co-sponsor of the Senate version of the law, "[W]hile H.R. 5116 will improve the
1995] 329
11
330 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
C. The Clash Between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code
"[T]he Bankruptcy Code and CERCLA point toward com-
peting objectives. The Code aims to provide... debtors with
a fresh start ... [and] CERCLA aims to clean up environmen-
tal damage."63 "Impairment of a cleanup claim [by bank-
ruptcy] affects more than the economic fate of the claimant; it
also compromises the entire national cleanup effort by dimin-
ishing the Superfund."64 However, "cleanup claims tend to be
very large and lay a greater claim on the bankruptcy estate
than do tax claims or the other priority claims."65
"In practice, the confusion over the proper priority for
cleanup claims in bankruptcy puts unnecessary burdens and
risks on debtors, creditors and environmental agencies
alike."66 "All [of these] parties need a predictable and consis-
tent rule which will give proper deference to the important
environmental policy goals at stake."67 A loophole in the con-
vergence of CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code would allow
the PRP to injure citizens both inside and outside of the
PRP's community. By contributing to soil and groundwater
contamination, the PRP puts everyone who lives near the site
at risk, as well as those who are affected as the contamina-
tion migrates. In addition, all taxpayers suffer when govern-
ments spend time and money attempting to recover cleanup
costs paid originally with federal or state Superfunds. Fi-
nally, funds spent to clean up bankruptcy sites are diverted
from use on other sites. Thus, CERCLA must prevail in its
clash with the Bankruptcy Code.68
bankruptcy system, its greatest contributions will come from the commission it
creates ... which will evaluate the code's deficiencies, substantively and opera-
tionally, and make recommendations to the Congress for legislative change."
Id.
63. In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991).
64. Gary E. Claar, The Case for a Bankruptcy Code Priority for Environ-
mental Cleanup Claims, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 29, 33 (1992).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 34.
68. See infra part IV.B.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/11
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D. Case Law
In Ohio v. Kovacs,69 decided in 1985, the Supreme Court
held that a cleanup order acquired by the State of Ohio
against a property owner represented a monetary obligation
that was dischargeable in bankruptcy.70 In addition, the
Court, in its famous footnote 12, raised the issue of what a
hypothetical bankruptcy trustee could have done with Ko-
vacs' contaminated property.71 The Court proposed that the
trustee would have to choose between either selling the prop-
erty and having responsibility for cleaning it up or aban-
doning it to the prior owner to let them be responsible for the
hazardous waste problems. 72 However, the Court did not in-
dicate which option it preferred the trustee to exercise.
Later that year, the Third Circuit in Southern Railway
Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co.73 held that a purchaser has no
claim for cleanup costs against the previous owner's estate.74
The court focused its attention on the unresolved issue in the
Kovacs footnote. The court stated that, at the time Kovacs
was decided, case law required a purchaser of property to
clean it up when the value of the property was greater than
the cost of bringing it into compliance.75 If the property was
worth less than the cost of cleanup, it would have been aban-
doned to the prior owner. 76 In Southern Railway, since the
debtor in possession (analogous to a trustee) opted to sell, the
purchaser had to clean up the site. 77
In 1986 the Supreme Court responded to the Kovacs foot-
note 12 issue in Midatlantic National Bank v. New Jersey De-
partment of Environmental Protection.78 There, the Court
held that "a trustee may not abandon property in contraven-
69. 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 284 n.12.
72. Id.
73. Southern Ry. Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985).
74. Id. at 142.
75. Id. at 143.
76. Id.
77. Southern Ry., 758 F.2d 143.
78. Midatlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474
U.S. 494 (1986).
1995]
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tion of a state statute or regulation that is reasonably
designed to protect the public health or safety."79 Not to be
outdone by Kovacs, this landmark decision also featured a
footnote which has been relied upon by debtors trying to
avoid environmental liability. The footnote qualifies the
Court's holding:
[Tihis exception to the abandonment power vested in the
trustee by § 554 is a narrow one. It does not encompass a
speculative or indeterminate future violation of such laws
that may stem from abandonment. The abandonment
power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not rea-
sonably calculated to protect the public health and safety
from imminent and identifiable harm.80
Since 1986, the case law has been divided into two
camps. The first line of cases, following Southern Railway,
refuses to afford priority status based on the Midatlantic foot-
note.8 ' In In re N.P. Mining Co., punitive penalties were not
given priority because there was no threat to public health or
safety; thus, the fines were not part of the actual, necessary
expenses of preserving the estate.8 2 In In re Dant & Russell,
Inc., the court asserted that it would not perform a legislative
function by granting the priority.8 3 Finally, in In re Microfab,
Inc., the court concluded that "28 U.S.C. § 959(b) does not re-
quire a Chapter 7 trustee to clean contaminated real estate,
[and that even if the trustee were to spend all the estate's
funds on a cleanup], he would fail in achieving full compli-
ance with the state environmental statute."8 4 Thus, the court
refused to "require a trustee simply to throw money away,
even in the name of a worthy cause."8 5
79. Id. at 507.
80. Id. at n.9.
81. See, e.g., In re N.P. Mining Co., 963 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1992); In re
Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R.
161 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
82. In re N.P. Mining Co., 963 F.2d 1449, 1458 (11th Cir. 1992).
83. In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d 700, 709 (9th Cir. 1988).
84. In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 161, 168-69 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
85. Id.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/11
PENNSYLVANIA V. CONROY
The alternative view affords priority status to the state
or federal agency which removed the hazardous substances
from a site at the taxpayers' expense. The reasoning for this
view is that "if property on which toxic substances pose a sig-
nificant hazard to public health cannot be abandoned, it must
follow.., that expenses to remove the threat posed by such
substances are necessary to preserve the estate [and are
therefore administrative expenses under 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(1)(A)]." 8 6 This analysis also formed the basis for the
holding in the lead case.8 7
III. Pennsylvania v. Conroy88
A. Facts and Procedural History
Cello Print, Inc. (Cello Print), is a wholly-owned subsidi-
ary of Roy Wood, Inc., engaged in the business of printing.
8 9
"Debtor Frank Conroy owns 100 percent of the stock of Roy
Wood, Inc. and is its president."90 In 1990, Cello Print ceased
and abandoned its operations, leaving drums and canisters
containing chemicals and solvents used in the printing
business. 91
On July 19, 1990, the manager of the town in which Cello
Print was located, White Oak Borough, Pennsylvania, noti-
fied the state's Department of Environmental Resources
(DER) that there were drums of unidentified chemicals at
86. In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1010 (2d Cir. 1991). See infra
part IV.B. See also In re Torwico Elec., Inc., 8 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1993) (discuss-
ing Chateaugay approvingly); In re Wall Tube & Metal Prod. Co., 831 F.2d 118
(6th Cir. 1987); In re Stevens, 68 B.R. 774 (D. Me. 1987) (state entitled to ad-
ministrative expense priority for costs it incurred in removing waste from prop-
erty of the estate); In re Peerless Plating Co., 70 B.R. 943 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1987); In re Mowbray Eng'g Co., Inc., 67 B.R. 34 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1986) (court
permitted EPA to recover the cost of decontaminating property abandoned by
the trustee as an administrative expense); In re Distrigas Corp., 66 B.R. 382
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (to the extent that the state expended funds to clean up
debtor's contaminated property, it would be entitled to a first priority adminis-
trative expense claim).
87. See infra part II.B.
88. 24 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1994).
89. In re Conroy, 153 B.R. 686, 687 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
90. Id.
91. Id.
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Cello Print.92 DER inspected the site and found several
drums with rusted bottoms sitting in water.93
Conroy was notified by DER on July 23, 1990, that Cello
Print had violated the Pennsylvania Solid Waste Manage-
ment Act and was directed to arrange for proper disposal of
the drums within 30 days.94 After no action was taken, a for-
mal field compliance order was issued September 14, 1990,
ordering Conroy to remove all hazardous wastes by October
3, 1990. 95
On October 4, 1990, DER inspected the facility and found
that the wastes had not yet been cleaned up.96 On October
23, 1990, Conroy and his wife filed a voluntary Chapter 11
petition.97 DER was not formally notified of the bankruptcy
filing, nor was it listed as a creditor. 98
On December 31, 1990, DER ordered a prompt interim
response pursuant to the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites
Cleanup Act (PHSCA).99 PHSCA is authorized by CER-
CLA.loo Many PHSCA provisions are analogous to the fed-
eral law.101 PHSCA was passed for the following reasons:
Many of the hazardous sites in this Commonwealth [Penn-
sylvania] which do not qualify for cleanup under the Fed-
eral Superfund Act pose a substantial threat to the public
92. Id.
93. 153 B.R. at 687.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 153 B.R. at 687.
98. Id.
99. Id. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6020.505(B) (1994). This section author-
ized an interim response by DER "when, upon the basis of the information
available to the department at the time of the interim response, there is a rea-
sonable basis to believe that prompt action is required to protect the public
health or safety or the environment." Id.
100. CERCLA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) states that "nothing in this chap-
ter shall be construed as preempting any State from imposing additional liabil-
ity or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous substances within
such State."
101. These analogous sections include: 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6020.505-De-
velopment and implementation of response actions; § 6020.507-Recovery of
response costs; § 6020.701-Definition of responsible person and § 6020.702-
Scope of liability.
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health and environment. Therefore, an independent site
cleanup program is necessary to promptly and comprehen-
sively address the problem of hazardous substance re-
leases in this Commonwealth, whether or not these sites
qualify for cleanup under the Federal Superfund Act. 102
On January 11, 1991, DER obtained a court order which
granted it access to Cello Print to perform the interim re-
sponse.-0 3 DER hired a private contractor to clean up the site
at a cost of $103,293.104 The following year it filed a proof of
claim for its cleanup costs, and requested payment as an ad-
ministrative expense, pursuant to section 503(b)(1)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code.105 DER also requested an additional ten
percent for administrative and legal fees pursuant to section
6020.507(b) of the Pennsylvania statute. 10 6
The debtors objected to DER's proof of claim on April 14,
1992 and a hearing on the objection was held on August 19,
1992.107 The objection was overruled by Judge Markovitz,
who awarded DER $103,293.108 However, DER was denied
the ten percent in administrative and legal costs it had
requested.109
The debtors appealed to the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania, arguing that DER
was not entitled to the contracting costs. 110 Moreover, DER
appealed the finding that it was not entitled to the additional
102. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6020.102(8) (1994).
103. In re Conroy, 153 B.R. 686, 687 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
104. Id. at 688.
105. Id. See supra part II.B.3.
106. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6020.507(B) (1994). This section provides that
in an action to recover response costs... the department shall in-
clude administrative and legal costs incurred from its initial inves-
tigation up to the time that it recovers its costs. The amount
attributable to administrative and legal costs shall be 10% of the
amount paid for the response action or the actual costs, whichever
is greater.
Id.
107. In re Conroy, 144 B.R. 966, 969 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992).
108. Id. at 968.
109. Id. at 971.
110. In re Conroy, 153 B.R. 686, 688 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
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ten percent for legal and administrative fees.'11 On May 12,
1993, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order
that DER was entitled to $103,293 in cleanup costs. 11 2 In ad-
dition, the district court held that DER was entitled to an ad-
ditional $10,329.30 as administrative and legal costs,
reversing the bankruptcy court's prior holding. 13 Thus, DER
was awarded the entire $113,622.30 it had sought. 114 The
Conroys appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit. 115
B. Reasoning and Holding
The circuit court affirmed the district court's decision
that DER is entitled to $113,622.30 in administrative ex-
penses.11 6 The court first considered the reasoning of Mid-
atlantic.1 7 In Midatlantic, the Supreme Court held that a
bankruptcy trustee could not abandon a piece of property
under section 554 of the Code in contravention of a state stat-
ute designed to promote public health or safety."18 Thus, the
Conroys, as debtors in possession, a position analogous to
trustee, could not have abandoned the hazardous property in
contravention of the Pennsylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup
Act." 9
The court further reasoned that if "Frank Conroy had ar-
ranged for cleanup of the facility after he had filed a Chapter
11 petition, the costs of this cleanup would have constituted
administrative expenses under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A)."' 20
In Conroy, the DER, rather than Conroy, paid for the
cleanup. Since the estate could not have avoided such costs
through abandonment, the Third Circuit agreed with previ-
111. Id.
112. Id. at 693.
113. Id.
114. In re Conroy, 153 B.R. at 693.
115. Pennsylvania v. Conroy, 24 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1994).
116. Id. at 571.
117. Id. at 566; see supra part II.D.
118. Midatlantic Natl Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474
U.S. 494, 507 (1986).
119. Conroy, 24 F.3d at 569.
120. Id.
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol13/iss1/11
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ous holdings of the Second 121 and Sixth 122 Circuits that "re-
sponse costs incurred by environmental agencies should be
classified as administrative expenses." 123
The Conroys argued that under the reasoning of South-
ern Railway Co.124 and In re Dant & Russell, Inc.125 a differ-
ent result was appropriate. 126  The Conroy court
distinguished both of these decisions. 127 Southern Railway
Co. dealt with a state administrative order requiring cleanup
of a site.128 As the Conroy court pointed out, this case "said
nothing about whether a bankruptcy court may grant admin-
istrative expense priority to the costs that an environmental
agency incurs cleaning up a hazardous waste site that could
not be abandoned under state law."129 Moreover, the bank-
ruptcy court in In re Virginia Builders stated that Southern
Railway Co. is "questionable precedent" in light of the
Supreme Court's Midatlantic decision.' 30
The Third Circuit also distinguished the Ninth Circuit's
decision in In re Dant & Russell, Inc.131 In re Dant & Russell,
Inc. dealt with a lessor who had a bankruptcy claim against a
lessee for cleanup costs for hazardous wastes placed on site
121. In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming the hold-
ing of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
that all cleanup costs assessed post-petition by EPA, where there has been a
pre-petition release or threatened release of hazardous wastes, will be entitled
to administrative expense priority).
122. In re Wall Tube & Metal Products, Co., 831 F.2d 118, 123-24 (6th Cir.
1987). The facts of this case are almost identical to the facts of Conroy. Debtor
Wall Tube's manufacturing processes generated hazardous substances which
were cleaned up by the Tennessee Department of Health and Environment af-
ter Wall Tube had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy liquidation. The court held
that the trustee of the estate was required to comply with the state's hazardous
waste statute, and that the response costs incurred by Tennessee were recover-
able as administrative expenses. Id.
123. Conroy, 24 F.3d at 569-70.
124. Southern Ry. Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1985).
125. In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988).
126. Conroy, 24 F.3d at 570.
127. Id.
128. Southern Ry., 758 F.2d 137.
129. Conroy, 24 F.3d at 570.
130. In re Virginia Builders, 153 B.R. 729, 734 n.10 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993).
131. Conroy, 24 F.3d at 570 n.1.
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by the lessee. 132 The lessor was denied administrative ex-
pense priority by the court. 133
However, the In re Dant & Russell, Inc. court pointed out
that "quite a different result . . . is warranted when the
cleanup costs result from monies expended for the preserva-
tion of the bankruptcy estate." 3 4 The Ninth Circuit also
noted that Kovacs and Southern Railway Co. "are significant
in that they involved assertions of administrative expense
priority by a lessor for cleanup costs resulting from property
not owned by the bankruptcy estate." 35 The court concluded
.that "[w]hen a claimant expends funds that preserve the es-
tate, treatment as an administrative expense is authorized by
the Bankruptcy Code. '136 Therefore, In re Dant & Russell,
Inc. actually undermined the Conroys' argument, rather than
supported it.
The essential aspect of the Conroy holding was the allow-
ance of the administrative and legal costs incurred by DER as
administrative expenses. 137 The court held that these costs
were not a "surcharge" as suggested by the Conroys, but con-
stituted "actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving
the estate." 38 Thus, the court "[saw] no reason why the ad-
ministrative and legal costs incurred by the DER in arrang-
ing for the cleanup [could] not qualify as administrative
expenses under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A)."' 3 9
In addition, the court held that the amount of the award
was "sufficiently substantiated" by the Pennsylvania statute,
which allows 10% of the amount paid for the response action
or the actual costs, whichever is greater, for administrative
and legal expenses. 140 The court concluded that "this implicit
132. In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d at 701-02.
133. Id. at 709.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. In re Dant & Russell, Inc., 853 F.2d at 709 (emphasis added).
137. 24 F.3d 568, 570 (3d Cir. 1994).
138. Id. Here, the court is using the language of 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A), the
section defining administrative expenses. See supra part H.B.3.
139. Conroy, 24 F.3d at 570.
140. Id. at 571. The court is referring to 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6020.507(B)
(1994).
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legislative finding [was] reasonable," and "it [sufficiently sat-
isfied] the DER's burden of proving its entitlement to these
administrative expenses." 4 1
IV. Analysis
A. The Third Circuit's Reasoning in Conroy
The Third Circuit properly applied the precedent of In re
Chateaugay Corp.'42 and In re Wall & Tube Metal Products,
Co.143 in classifying the response costs incurred by DER as
administrative expenses. Since the drums on the Cello Print
property posed a significant threat to the environment,'44
and Frank Conroy refused to remove the threat,145 DER was
forced to act pursuant to its authority under the Penn-
sylvania Hazardous Sites Cleanup Act.146 As the Conroy
court correctly reasoned, these cleanup expenses 147 were "ac-
tual and necessary expenses of preserving the estate." 148
Thus, they are entitled to administrative expense priority
under 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A).
The Third Circuit expanded upon precedent in this area
by allowing an additional 10% of the total cleanup costs for
administrative and legal expense incurred by DER.149 This
141. Conroy, 24 F.3d at 571.
142. In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir. 1991).
143. In re Wall & Tube Metal Prod., Co., 831 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1987).
144. In re Conroy, 144 B.R. 966, 968-69 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992). DER in-
spected the Cello Print site on July 20, 1990, finding drums and canisters con-
taining hazardous chemicals, several of which had been sitting in water and
were rusted on the bottom. In addition, the roof of the building leaked. On
December 11, 1990, DER issued a "HSCA Response Justification Document,"
determining that an actual or potential threat to the environment existed. Id.
145. Id. Frank Conroy was sent a Notice of Violation by DER on July 23,
1990, informing him that Cello Print was in violation of the Pennsylvania Solid
Waste Management Act. Upon inspection of the facility on October 4, 1990,
DER found that the violations had not been remediated. Id.
146. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6020.505 (1994).
147. In re Conroy, 144 B.R. at 969. DER paid E & E, Inc., a private contrac-
tor, to perform remediation work at the site. Id.
148. Pennsylvania v. Conroy, 24 F.3d 568, 571 (3d Cir. 1994).
149. Id.; Cf In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 303 (1993) (the court granted administrative expense
priority for past response costs and affirmed the lower court's order disallowing
an award of attorney fees).
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expansion is significant because it will encourage government
entities to engage in cleanups since their full expenditures,
including costly administrative and legal fees, will receive the
highest priority when the bankruptcy estate is ultimately dis-
tributed. As a result, more sites will be remediated more
quickly.
The original congressional intent in enacting CERCLA
(prompt and thorough remediation of the nation's inactive
hazardous waste sites) will be furthered by granting adminis-
trative expense status to state response costs.' 5 0 Thus, it is
sound public policy. While the interests of all creditors to an
estate are certainly important and viable, the cleanup of sites
must take priority when the proceeds of the estate are dis-
tributed. If they do not, the purpose of CERCLA will be com-
pletely undermined by the bankruptcy claims of PRPs.
B. Solutions
The Conroy decision must now be incorporated into bind-
ing law. In refusing to grant certiorari to review In re Hem-
ingway Transp., Inc.,' 51 the Supreme Court passed up an
excellent opportunity to rule on the issue of future cleanup
costs as administrative expenses. In that case, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit disallowed a claim for future re-
sponse costs as administrative expenses, while at the same
time allowing such priority for past costs and denying attor-
neys' fees.' 5 2 Thus, judicial review has been exhausted for
the foreseeable future, as the Conroys do not intend to appeal
the decision of the Third Circuit. 5 3
Congress also has not dealt with this issue. The
Superfund Reauthorization Act of 1994/5 failed to address
150. See supra part IIA.1.
151. In re Hemingway, 993 F.2d 915.
152. Id. In re Hemingway is distinguished from Conroy, in that, In re Hem-
ingway concerned an action by a subsequent purchaser of contaminated prop-
erty for indemnification, under CERCLA, from the debtor-seller of the property.
Both parties were PRPs under CERCLA and, therefore, jointly and severally
liable. However, in Conroy, the party seeking priority for cleanup expenses was
the Pennsylvania DER, a state agency facing no liability. Id.
153. Telephone Interview with Gregory M. Devine, Esq., attorney for the
Conroys (Sept. 1994).
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the problems related to the filing for bankruptcy protection
by PRPs.154 While focusing on many important areas, the bill
fails to address the problem with which this paper grapples:
who gets priority, and to what extent, when a PRP is bank-
rupt and there are limited funds to be distributed amongst
many creditors, including the state which paid for cleanup. 195
In addition, an amendment dealing with hazardous
waste site remediation was not included in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994.156 Specifically, the Act failed to address
administrative expense priority for environmental cleanups.
Such an amendment has been suggested by, among others,
Gregory Devine, the attorney for the Conroys throughout the
DER litigation. 157
However, the Act did create the Bankruptcy Review
Commission to evaluate the Code's deficiencies and make rec-
ommendations to Congress for legislative change. 158 This
blue-ribbon panel1 59 is charged with submitting to Congress,
the Chief Justice, and the President a report within two years
of its first meeting.160 "The report [is to] contain a detailed
statement of the findings and conclusions of the Commission,
154. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
155. Id.
156. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106
(1994) (amending 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)).
157. Telephone Interview with Gregory M. Devine, Esq., attorney for the
Conroys (Sept. 1994). See also Gary E. Claar, The Case for a Bankruptcy Code
Priority for Environmental Cleanup Claims, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 29, 33
(1992) (arguing for a similar change to the Bankruptcy Code); In re Dant &
Russell, 853 F.2d 700, 709 (9th Cir. 1988). In addition, the National Governors'
Association has suggested an analogous amendment to CERCLA. National
Governors'Association Position on Superfund, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG.
REC. E1022 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Florio).
158. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 602, 108 Stat.
4106 (1994).
159. The Commission is composed of nine members, appointed as follows:
three by the President, one of whom is designated chairman; one by President
pro tempore of the Senate; one by the Minority Leader of the Senate; one by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives; one by the Minority Leader of the
House; and two by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 604, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
160. Id. at § 608, 108 Stat. at 4106.
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together with its recommendations for such legislative or ad-
ministrative action as it considers appropriate."161
One of the considerations of this review board should be
administrative expense priority for state-funded cleanups of
hazardous waste sites, 162 especially in light of the decisions of
the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits approving such prior-
ity.' 63 In fact, when Congress tried to create the Commission
in 1992, co-sponsor Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) listed
among the topics that the Commission should review and
study "the highly complex and controversial issues that re-
sult from... environmental... law."' 6
4
Finally, the Third Circuit's decision in Conroy creates
momentum for the expansion of administrative expenses to
include administrative and legal costs. The legacy of this im-
portant decision will be to underscore "that bankruptcy is not
the solution for escaping liability incurred either under state
or federal law for environmental damage." 16
5
As important as bankruptcy is to our system of credit,
CERCLA must be the prevailing law. A PRP should not be
able to escape liability, for the contamination which it cre-
ated, through the protections afforded by the Bankruptcy
Code. However, "[tihe Bankruptcy Code, as is, simply does
not accommodate the unique and unforeseen problems of
cleanup claims."166 Thus, following the lead of Conroy, Con-
gress must amend the Bankruptcy Code to correct this perva-
161. Id.
162. Upon publication, a copy of this casenote will be forwarded to the Bank-
ruptcy Review Commission.
163. See supra part II.D. In addition, the Ninth Circuit in In re Dant & Rus-
sell, Inc. commented that "courts are not free to formulate their own rules of
super or sub-priorities within a specifically enumerated class." In re Dant &
Russell, Inc. 853 F.2d 700, 709 (9th Cir. 1988). Thus, the court reasoned that
"until. . . Congress amends sections 503 and 507 to give priority to claims for
cleanup costs, we are without authority to create such a priority." Id. The new
mechanism for Congress to create such priority is through the recommenda-
tions of the Review Commission. See supra note 159.
164. 138 CONG. REC. S17549 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992).
165. Marvin Krasny & Kevin J. Carey, Cleanup Costs Reimbursable As Part
of Administration; 3rd Circuit Ruling, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, June 7, 1994,
at 13.
166. Claar, supra note 64, at 34.
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sive problem in the administration of state cleanup
programs.
V. Conclusion
In Pennsylvania v. Conroy,167 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit held that cleanup expenses in-
curred by a state environmental agency to eliminate a signifi-
cant threat to the environment should be afforded
administrative expense priority under section 503(b)(1)(A) of
the Bankruptcy Code. In addition, the court awarded the
state agency administrative and legal costs as well. This im-
portant decision, which places CERCLA above the Bank-
ruptcy Code in the legislative hierarchy, will hopefully
inspire the newly-created Bankruptcy Review Commission to
recommend such priority for all environmental cleanups
funded by taxpayers.
167. Pennsylvania v. Conroy, 24 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. 1994).
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